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23 
Bottlenecks in the Transformation of Eastern Europe 
Vojtech Cepl* 
We are approaching the tenth anniversary of the 1989 revolutions 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and so you might ask: Why is he still 
talking about the transformation in Eastern Europe? The reason is 
simple: We are still in the midst of the transformation and, in some 
respects, the pendulum is swinging back. In many cases, what was 
done was accomplished imperfectly because the needs and the nature 
of the transformation were poorly understood. While political 
institutions can be reformed relatively quickly (after all, we have 
models to follow), the reform effort did not transform the political 
culture. As a result, there is now a tendency to feel nostalgic for the 
old days, reflected in a renewed popularity of the former communist 
parties. The economic systems were reformed to a certain degree, 
however, as I shall explain below, the inherent, but more subtle, 
obstacles in transforming a backward economy are now revealing 
themselves. Moreover, although the legal system underwent 
significant modifications, it still does not function properly to meet 
the needs of, for example, a market economy. 
In any case, transformation would be incomplete. The mere 
reform of political, economic, and legal systems does not constitute a 
genuine transformation. Instead of focusing on the specifics, I would 
like to focus on the neglected and, in my view, the most crucial and 
simultaneously elusive aspect of the transformation—the 
transformation of the normative order, which is based on the value 
order. My discussion of this historic transformation will center 
primarily on the relationship between the normative order and the 
legal order.  
I first want to emphasize something which is sometimes not 
entirely understood in the United States. The legal order involves a 
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great deal more than mere legislation in the form of legal directives 
issued by state authorities. Another aspect of the legal order’s proper 
functioning is represented by the extra-legal normative systems that 
originate, in contrast to legislation, from the people. Extra-legal 
normative systems are often the product of either implicit and 
voluntary agreements or of the natural and spontaneous generation of 
rules of human conduct created by the hearts and minds of the 
people. It is essential to bear in mind that, for an official legal system 
or legal order to function properly, it should be in harmony with the 
relevant society’s normative order. 
Perhaps my point can best be illustrated by comparing two 
countries: the Czech Republic and the former East Germany. Prior to 
the 1989 revolutions, both countries had relatively similar economic 
and political situations as well as similar legal systems. Nonetheless, 
it was widely believed that because East Germany was to be 
incorporated into West Germany, then a fully-operating western 
country with the largest and strongest economy in Europe, East 
Germany would have a much better chance of success with its 
transformation. East Germany would not need to transform its 
economic, political, and legal systems but rather simply adopt those 
already established in West Germany. In addition, East Germany 
received a colossal amount of quality assistance during its transition. 
For example, in one year, approximately DM 140 billion were spent 
on reviving East Germany’s economy, in sharp contrast to the 
approximately Kc4 billion that the Czech Republic received during 
its transition. 
Further, East Germany had a prepared legal order and was already 
accustomed to the law of West Germany that was to be applied under 
these new circumstances. Essentially, East Germany acceded to West 
Germany’s established legal order, requiring merely that it begin 
applying the existing law that already went through years of fine 
tuning in West Germany. Moreover, East Germany’s legal order had 
far more civil law continuity with the pre-communist system than the 
Czech Republic had between its own old and new legal orders. The 
basic structure of East Germany’s Burgenliches GesetzBuch (BGB) 
legal order remained valid and stable throughout the communist era. 
This sharply contrasts with the Czech Republic, which put into 
practice such poisonous ideas as the separation of commercial and 
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family law from civil law and, even worse, the classification of civil 
law relations under the 1964 Czechoslovak Civil Code into three 
groups according to the configuration of parties: 1) actions between 
two citizens; 2) actions between a citizen and a state organ; and 3) 
actions between state organs. 
West Germany also assisted the transformation of the East 
German legal order by replacing East Germany’s legal personnel. 
From the West came armies of fresh, well-educated, hard-working, 
ambitious, and determined lawyers and judges, all fluent in the 
language and trained in the legal system—something other post-
communist countries could only dream about. Therefore, when filling 
the important positions of legal order—judges, law professors, and 
lawyers—the East Germans swept away the old, corrupted, and 
compromised legal personnel. Their ability and training were suspect 
to begin with, and their loyalty to the new regime could never be 
fully relied upon. The East Germans replaced them with fully-trained, 
competent, uncompromised, and trustworthy personnel. The new 
personnel, in fact, knew the German legal system better than the 
people they replaced. With these and many other factors in mind, 
most predicted a smooth, quick, problem-free, and highly successful 
transformation in East Germany. 
So much for predictions. Paradoxically, the new legal system does 
not function properly in East Germany, despite all of the advantages 
East Germany seemingly enjoyed. Countering contrary expectations, 
the transformation in East Germany did not fare markedly better than 
the transformation in the Czech Republic. 
The transformation of the legal system in the Czech Republic 
occurred under considerably less favorable circumstances. The true 
inner political struggle in the Czech Republic was fought between 
those on the left, strong advocates of legal continuity including some 
I view as crypto-communists, and those on the right, the ruling 
government coalition led by economists who shared a thinly-
disguised, deep contempt for law. When the debate between these 
two opposing camps plays out, there is little wonder that reform of 
the legal system continues to be a great obstruction to successful 
transformation. Within both camps, the idea that reform of the law 
presents no special difficulties or obstacles prevails and is 
enthusiatically supported, even by the former communists. For 
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example, both camps believe that learning managerial skills and 
technical rules about how to run businesses solves all commercial law 
problems. In light of my discussion of the normative order, this belief 
is hopelessly flawed. In order for businesses to function in 
conformity with western models, businesses must first learn the basic 
principles: do not steal (respect others’ property); do not envy (fair 
play and respect for business partners); and do not lie or cheat (keep 
your promises). 
Why, then, is the transformation of the German legal order rockier 
than expected? To answer this question, one must dig a bit deeper 
into legal theory and consider the different aspects of the legal order 
previously mentioned. In my view, an answer can be found, in part, 
by considering three approaches to the concept of law. 
The first, and most rudimentary, approach is what I call “linguistic 
formalism” or analytical or conceptual jurisprudence. Linguistic 
formalism is a dogmatic approach to law that deals only with law in 
books and law on paper. The linguistic formalism model limits the 
law to that which is defined in statutes and regulations and interprets 
law according to strict linguistic criteria considering only the actual, 
literal meaning of the words used. Linguistic formalism does not 
consider the purposes for which the law was adopted. 
The second, a sociological approach, usually referred to as “legal 
realism,” attempts to describe actual behavior of legal subjects 
through observation. Legal realism considers real-life relations and 
not mere relations on paper. Rather than analyzing legal relations and 
institutions in the abstract, legal realism investigates how laws are 
enforced and how legal norms are implemented in practice. 
The third, a psychological approach, considers not just legal texts 
or the conduct of state officials, but, more fundamentally, “legal 
consciousness”; that is, how law penetrates the hearts and minds of 
the people. Legal consciousness considers how knowledge about law 
spreads, how it is learned, and how it is internally accepted by 
people.  
In my view, the West German legal system failed to take hold in 
the East because it conflicted with the informal normative system in 
East Germany. The people of the former East Germany still do not 
accept the new legal order and, in many ways, view it as imposed 
upon them against their will. In order for a legal system to function, 
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the state must be able to rely on the fact that, in the vast majority of 
cases, people will voluntarily comply with the rules. This, in turn, 
underlies the importance of achieving harmony between informal 
normative systems, or morality, and law. Such harmony can only 
occur, if at all, when the state actually practices what it preaches: a 
problem which I shall consider further below. 
Given the need for harmony, one can see how crucial the legal 
consciousness model is. We should direct more attention to how 
changes in legal consciousness occur. This transformation is still 
underway because dealing with the psyche of the people requires a 
great deal of time, much like a marathon. First and foremost, it is 
vital to teach people that the law is a good thing and worth learning. 
This psychological approach emphasizes the importance of a positive 
environment to motivate people to accept the law as part of their own 
personal culture. 
A strong lack of acceptance, indeed hatred, of law was inherited 
from the communist regime. Our social engineers made a colossal 
mistake in attempting to resolve all the problems of society by market 
engineering and privatization, that is, by easy technical rules. While 
one can partially substitute the informal normative systems with 
legislation, it is too expensive, both financially and administratively, 
too awkward, and too labored. 
Therefore, I want to concentrate on the following two items: first, 
how the rules of human conduct are learned and spread; and second, 
how people are motivated to obey them. In thinking about these 
concepts we must keep in mind the two aspects of legal 
consciousness: sheer knowledge of the rules; and a positive internal 
attitude toward them, that is, the inner acceptance of agreement with 
the rules. There are several relevant factors helpful for learning the 
rules and several different avenues for spreading their acceptance.  
First, the state, to give the crucial signal, must act as a role model 
during the transformation process. Generally, people do not learn 
about the law from reading statutes or law books, rather, they learn 
about the law indirectly from the decisions made by state authorities. 
People will judge the law positively or negatively according to the 
state authorities’ actions: No factor influences the people’s attitude 
towards the legal order more than the state’s own attitude toward the 
legal order it is advocating. If the state acts cynically and 
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hypocritically by solemnly declaring rules and then blatantly 
disregarding them in practice, behavior typical of totalitarian regimes, 
then the state signals to the people that the legal order binds only the 
people, while leaving the state and state officials free to act as they 
wish.  
Accordingly, after the revolution in the Czech state, the most 
important signals from the state concerned decommunization, 
lustration, and restitution. The Czech state decommunized by 
adopting the Act on the Lawlessness of the Communist Regime, 
which condemned the communist regime as criminal and illegitimate, 
and made clear that those who committed crimes on behalf of the 
state are still subject to punishment. Lustration ensured that 
unreliable people, such as former secret police informers, could not 
hold sensitive state offices. Finally, restitution involved the immense 
and complicated process of returning to the people the property stolen 
by the communist regime. Through these means, the state made a 
sincere attempt to openly declare that its past behavior was wrong 
and then, to a certain extent, to correct the wrongs it committed. The 
implementation of this legislation, although imperfect, provided an 
important signal to the society that in turn influenced the 
development of basic societal values. 
The second avenue for spreading the normative order is through 
civic associations. I define civic associations as groupings that 
occupy the social space between the family and the state. They are 
the milieu, the fertile soil, for the growth and spontaneous 
development of the rules of human cooperation and coexistence. In 
essence, people learn these associations through contact and 
interaction with others. In contrast to legislation, which is the product 
of the sovereign will, orders from a superior, and the resulting 
exercise of power over subordinates, these informal rules are the 
spontaneous products of people. If the state and the people mutually 
accept and support these rules, thus creating a harmonious and 
productive society, then it is not necessary to enforce, through 
traditional legislative methods, every normative behavior. 
I speak of civic associations in a very broad sense to encompass 
more than charitable and educational organizations. There is a wide 
spectrum of such organizations that range, in terms of formalization, 
from associations that are almost of a public law character, such as a 
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bar association, to the most unstructured types of common social 
gatherings. Informal associations, such as recreational groups or 
organizations directed toward a particular hobby, in particular, serve 
the function of developing the normative order. For example, a group 
that gathers during free-time, like a clique or a band, fits into this 
latter category. During the formative teenage years, such bands play 
an absolutely central role in socialization. 
Civic associations are one element that make free societies 
markedly different from totalitarian societies because, in the latter, 
the state is very jealous and suspicious. The state recognizes the 
influence, and therefore power, that such civic associations wield. 
The communists did not stamp out civic associations, as is commonly 
misperceived. Rather, the communists co-opted civic associations 
and allowed just a single, unified, and hence, fake association under 
strict state and party control. Therefore, it is important to remember 
that the Czech Republic, like other post-communist nations, is a 
virtual desert in terms of civic associations. The communist era left in 
its wake a very atomized society. In contrast to the 1989 situation, the 
Czechs were far better poised to overcome this problem in 1968, 
when a large portion of the people had experienced life in a free 
society and old civic organizations spontaneously revived without 
difficulty. Public officials tend to misconceive the critical importance 
of civic associations for spreading acceptance of the law. They feel 
that, in many cases, civic associations serve a function that belongs to 
the state, but that they do so without democratic legitimization and 
therefore should be regulated. In my view, this belief is a grave error. 
A third way the normative order spreads is through the family. A 
general misconception exists that the family is the most important 
sector. However, the newest research demonstrates that its 
importance is limited to a basic socialization function. For example, 
the parents’ love and touching of an infant is irreplaceable and 
without it the child suffers from deprivation syndrome. However, the 
absolutely critical years for social development, what are called the 
formative years, are the teenage years. During these years, young 
people rebel against parental influence and begin to follow the role 
models provided by their peers, heroes from sports, and characters 
from literature. The most recent studies contradict the view that the 
quality of teachers is the most significant factor in development 
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during these formative years. On the contrary, the teenager’s friends 
exert the most influence over her behavior, making it important that 
she have positive role models among her friends. For this reason, the 
location of the school, or the type of people among whom the 
teenager will surround herself, is far more important than the quality 
of teachers. 
Similarly, I believe the advantage of attending top universities is 
not that the professors are top in their field, or even Nobel Prize 
winners, but rather that students are placed among other students of 
the highest caliber. Vital study abroad programs at top universities 
demonstrate this advantage by bringing together diverse intellectuals 
from across the globe. 
The fourth avenue that spreads the normative order in the modern 
world is the media. I speak of the media in the broadest possible 
sense, including not only television and the press that have immense 
direct influence on our daily lives, but also more profound cultural 
expressions such as those found in literature, films, and even 
children’s fairy tales. The importance of this sector is apparent 
considering the necessity of harmony between informal and formal 
normative systems. The values conveyed in the media, especially in 
literature, constitute an irrational and non-cognitive milieu of 
conveying norms. Media shares a close connection with people’s 
emotions and so it teaches values in a stronger and much more 
effective way. To put it succinctly: The stirrings of the heart call forth 
the stirrings of the mind. In fact, a personal sense of justice, an 
irrational even emotional reaction to wrongdoing in the world, is the 
point where we can see clearly the connection between art, beauty, 
and law. They touch each other precisely at that point where myth or 
literature provides people with their deepest, most instinctual 
understandings. Of course, this coming together can be misused as 
the focus for propaganda. 
In 1990 a few professors at the University of Chicago Law School 
expressed great skepticism regarding the feasibility of any 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. They cited not only the 
great hardships involved in rapid economic restructuring and the lack 
of available finances, but also the fact that new democratic 
institutions are not generally conducive to undergoing such 
hardships. They argued that when people participate in the decision-
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making process, they will not be willing, in the long run, to suffer 
hardships such as widespread unemployment, inflation, and other 
deprivations that are necessary to achieve genuine economic 
transformation. They reasoned that after a certain period of tightening 
their belts, people will simply revolt against transformation and elect 
those who promise easier ways to reform the economy. However, 
financial assistance can overcome these inherent difficulties as 
evidenced, for example, by the Marshall Plan. 
The main point I wish to make is that economic transformation 
can be accelerated by replacing old financial capital with imported 
new capital: that is, by receiving assistance from sources like the 
Marshall Plan and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 
abroad. However, because it is so connected to the local culture, we 
cannot do the same for moral capital. Of course, legislation can serve 
as a substitute for informal, moral rules. Indeed, the replacement of 
morality with law is a trend occurring around the world and while 
workable in part, the placement has its limits: namely, it is financially 
costly and brings about serious repercussions in the form of 
alienation. When voluntary rules are replaced with the enforcement 
of hard legislation, the people’s aforementioned negative attitude 
toward the law, namely hatred and alienation, increases. Alienation 
from the law is among the most unfortunate legacies of the 
communist regimes and is in sharp contrast with the people’s 
personal identification with the legal system. 
It is impossible for the transformation in Eastern Europe to occur 
in a relatively short time unless we concentrate on the hearts and 
minds of our society. The people themselves must change, which is 
most likely to occur only with changing generations. However, the 
danger is that if we do not focus intensively on the education of the 
young generation now, the transformation will take even longer. For 
this reason, I conclude that it is better to send the young Eastern 
European students to the West than to have legal experts come to 
Prague to explain the legal rules of a particula r subject. As I said, 
transformation requires more than just learning the rules. Exposure to 
the entire complex of culture and life in a foreign society and the 
natural contact with foreign contemporaries, or learning by osmosis, 
is an unparalleled experience and cannot be substituted merely with 
lectures about new rules. 
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